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SWINBURNE'S MODAL ARGUMENT FOR
DUALISM: EPISTEMICALLY CIRCULAR
William Hasker

Most critics of Richard Swinburne's modal argument for mind-body substance
dualism have alleged that the argument is unsound, either because its premises are false or because it commits a modal fallacy. I show that the argument is
epistemically circular, and thus provides no support for its conclusion even if it
is sound.

Richard Swinburne's modal argument for substance dualism has attracted
a good deal of critical attention, not all of it from materialists. Most of the
criticisms allege that the argument is unsound, either because its premises
are false or because it commits modal fallacies. I shall argue that even if
the argument is sound it provides no support whatever for its conclusion.
Swinburne has stated his argument in several different ways, but the
version he regards as most rigorous and definitive is found in
Additional Note 2 to The Evolution of the Soul.' It goes as follows:
p = 'I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984'
q = 'my body is destroyed at the end of 1984'
r = 'I have a soul in 1984'
s = 'I exist in 1985'
x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with (p & q)
and describing 1984 states of affairs ....

The Argument may now be set out as follows:
Premise (1)
(x)<>(p & q & x & s)
Premise (2)
~<>(p & q & ~r & s)
Premise (3)
:. ~r is not within the range of x.
But since ~r describes a state of affairs in 1984, it is not compatible
with (p & q). But q can hardly make a difference to whether or not
r. So p is incompatible with ~r.
:. r. (p.314)

p

While this seems reasonably clear, our task of evaluation will be easier if
we restate (2) spelling out the restrictions explicitly. 'x' will then be simply a variable taking propositions as values, and it becomes possible to
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formalize the entire argument. So we have:
1.
2'.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

P

Premise

(x){[<>(p & q & x) & (x describes a state of affairs in 1984)] ::::J
<>(p & q & x & s»)
Premise
-<>(p & q & -r & s)
Premise
-r describes a state of affairs in 1984
Premise
-<>(p & q & -r)
From 2,3,4
-<>(p & q & -rb -<>(p & -r)
Premise
-<>(p & -r)
From 5,6
r
From 1,7

This argument is unquestionably valid. Premise (3) entails that it is
impossible for God to "re-create" a person who has been completely
destroyed, as has been proposed by John Hick among others. This
seems difficult to reconcile with Swinburne's acceptance of the idea that
it is possible for a substance to cease to exist and then come into existence a second time, and indeed that "it sometimes happens that a person (and so his soul) ceases to exist and then by an unexpected accident
comes to exist again" (p. 179). I don't at the moment see any promising
way to resolve this discrepancy, but it does seem to me that recreationism is a conceptual absurdity, so premise (3) will not be contested here.
(4) and (6) also seem correct, so the success of the argument will depend
on the evaluation of (2').
In support of (2) (and (2'», Swinburne states, "Premise (2) relies on
the intuition that whatever else might be the case in 1984, compatible
with (p & q), my stream of consciousness could continue thereafter" (p.
314). Before we assess this, we need to look at an interesting objection
suggested by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann. As a counterexample to (2) they proposed
I cease to exist at the last instant of 1984. 2
Swinburne replied to this, "Any proposition which affirms that something
existed throughout 1984 and then ceased to exist ... clearly involves an
entailment about a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing
then."o In saying this, Swinburne equates the idea of a proposition's
"describing a state of affairs in 1984" with the idea of a proposition's
asserting a hard fact about 1984, and he argues that the Stump and
Kretzmann example can't be a hard fact about 1984 because it entails a
hard fact about 1985. When in reply Stump and Kretzmann raised questions about the notion of "hard fact" employed by Swinburne, he replied
in effect that, since it is his argument that is under review, he is entitled to
his own definition of the notion of a hard fact. "So even if certain 'standard examples' of hard facts given by others don't count as hard facts on
my definition, that is irrelevant to my argument which remains intact."4
Now, whatever the merits of this strategy may be, it has the consequence that it is out of the question to appeal to anyone's prephilosophical intuitions (as Swinburne wants to do) in support of (2) and (2'). For
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it is wholly implausible to suppose that a philosophical layperson, or
even a philosopher who has not specifically considered the matter, has
in mind Swinburne's idiosyncratic notion of a "hard fact," and uses this
in forming an intuition about the truth of (2). And we can't rely here on
some general, intuitive idea of what it is for a proposition to describe a
state of affairs about a particular time. As the Stump and Kretzmann
counterexample shows, the precise explication of "hard fact" is crucial.
But if prephilosophical intuitions aren't in play here, what about the
intuitions of professional philosophers? I strongly suspect that the vast
majority of us, at any rate, are no better off than the layperson with
respect to grasping intuitively the truth or falsity of (2). For one thing, it
is not clear to me that Swinburne has specified his notion of "hard fact"
sufficiently to enable us to know what its necessary and sufficient conditions may be, let alone grasp it intuitively so as to use it in evaluating
(2).5 And (2) (better, (2'» is in any case a moderately complex proposition; the sort of proposition, in fact, concerning which it behooves one to
be quite modest about his ability to assess its truth by logical intuition.
I suggest, then, that if we are to evaluate (2') we can do no better than
take the course marked out for us by Stump and Kretzmann, and proceed by first proposing and then evaluating possible counterexamples.
And for the time being, it may be best to avoid counterexamples whose
"hard fact" status is in question. If a clear counterexample should
emerge (2') is doomed, whereas if (2') proves robust in the face of putative counterexamples it is at least worthy of serious consideration.
But now, what about -r itself as a counterexample to (2')? What has
to be evaluated is the following instance of (2'):
(2'*) [<>(p & q & -r) & (-1' describes a state of affairs in
1984)]::J <>(p & q & -r & s)

We have already agreed to premise (3), which states that the consequent
of (2'*) is false, and to (4), which states that the second conjunct in the
antecedent is true. 6 So the counterexample will succeed if and only if
<>(p & q & -1') is true. Now <>(p & q & -r) can be true only if <>(p & -r)
is also true. And, given (6), the converse also is true; if <>(p & -r) is true
so is <>(p & q & -1'). So (2') survives the alleged counterexample only if
<>(p & -r) is false and (7) -<>(p & -r) is true instead. Now, opinions
about (7) will certainly vary. Swinburne thinks it is true; materialists,
and a good many dualists other than Swinburne, will think it false. The
important point, however, is this: (7) is itself a principal conclusion of
Swinburne's argument for dualism. To be sure, the formal conclusion of
the argument is not (7) but rather (8) r. But the move from (1) and (7) to
(8) is trivial; Swinburne could just as well have left (7) as the final conclusion (thus, incidentally, rendering premise (1) superfluous). But this
means, that Swinburne's argument for dualism is epistemically circular
in the sense explicated by Victor Reppert,' namely that "no reasonably
well- informed person would accept the premise who does not already
accept the conclusion." Indeed, any reasonable person must acknowledge that the premise in this case is less well-supported than the conclu-
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sion, since even if (7) is true there are additional serious questions that
can arise about
the truth of (2'). (For instance, questions about
Swinburne's definition of hard facts, as well as about other possible
counterexamples to (2').) It seems, then, that Swinburne's argument can
provide no rational support whatever for the acceptance of dualism. s
It might seem that he conclusion about epistemic circularity could be
avoided if someone were to have a clear and specific rational intuition
about the truth of (2') which did not depend on the belief that p and -r
are incompatible. But how is this supposed to go? Regardless of the
intuitions that may be involved, anyone possessing modest logical acumen is bound to recognize the need to test (2') against possible counterexamples. And given the content of the argument, the possibility that
-r might constitute a counterexample lies ready to hand. But once this
possibility has been raised, the game is up: either the counterexample
succeeds, and the argument is unsound, or it fails, and the argument is
epistemically circular. 9 So Swinburne's argument is at best epistemically
circular, and it contributes nothing to the rational acceptability of dualism for anyone, including Swinburne himself.

Huntington College
NOTES
1. Page references in the text are to Swinburne's The Evolution of the Soul
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1986). It should be noted in this connection
that William P. Alston and Thomas W. Smythe have charged Swinburne's
argument with various modal fallacies ("Swinburne's Argument for
Dualism," Faith and PhilosopJzy 11:1 (January 1994), pp. 127-33; for
Swinburne's reply see "Dualism Intact," Faith and Philosophy 13:1 (January
1996), pp. 68-77). As regards the argument as presented in ch. 8 of The
Evolution of the Soul, their charges seem quite plausible. But Swinburne
introduces the argument of Additional Note 2 explicitly "in case anyone suspects the argument ... of committing some modal fallacy" (p. 314; this material appears in New Appendix C, p. 322, of the revised edition published in
1997). Alston and Smythe'S charge of a modal fallacy in this version of the
argument, which rests on a particular interpretation of Swinburne's reason
for affirming (2), is less than compelling.
2. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "An Objection to
Swinburne's Argument for Dualism," Faith and Philosophy 13:3 (July 1996), p.
406.
3. See ibid., p. 407.
4. "Reply to Stump and Kretzmann," Faith and Philosophy 13:3 (July
1996), p. 413.
5. For some of the perplexities, and contestable assumptions, involved
in Swinburne's employment of this notion, see the articles by Stump and
Kretzmann and Swinburne cited above.
6. Of course, if either of these premises were rejected, the argument
would immediately be rejected as unsound.
7. See Victor Reppert, "Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and
Begging the Question," Metaphilosophy 23 (1992), p. 389.
B. This is by no means merely the point that, as Swinburne acknowl-
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edges, his "argument will not convince anyone who claims to be more certain that the conclusion is false than that the premises are true" ("Dualism
Intact," p. 71). As Swinburne rightly states, this is true of all arguments and
constitutes no particular fault of his argument for dualism. But it is not true
of all arguments-or of any good ones-that they are epistemically circular,
in that the premises cannot reasonably be accepted by anyone not already
convinced that the conclusion is true.
9. According to Stump and Kretzmann, Swinburne considers it question-begging for an opponent to invoke ~r as a counterexample to (2)
(Stump and Kretzmann, p. 411 n. 9). Whatever the merits of this contention,
it has no force against my procedure in this discussion. I don't assert that ~r
is a counterexample; instead, I show that whether it is or not, the argument
is ineffective.

